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Abstract
Endogenous access pricing (ENAP) is an alternative to the more traditional form of
access pricing that sets the access price to reect the regulators estimate of the suppliers
average cost of providing access. Under ENAP, the access price reects the suppliers actual
average cost of providing access, which varies with realized industry output. We show that
in addition to eliminating the need to estimate industry output accurately and avoiding
a divergence between upstream revenues and costs, ENAP can enhance the incentive of a
vertically integrated producer to minimize its upstream operating cost.
Keywords. Endogenous access pricing, regulation, vertical integration.
JEL Classications. L22, L51.
a Norwegian School of Economics (kenneth.fjell@nhh.no).
b University of Cincinnati (debashis.pal@uc.edu).
c Corresponding Author.
Department of Economics, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611-7140.
Email: sapping@u.edu; Voice: (352) 392-3904; Fax: (352) 392-2111.
SNF Working Paper No 09/13
1 Introduction
In many settings, a regulated rm that sells an essential input at a stipulated price also
competes downstream against rms that purchase the input. To illustrate, the owner of a
telecommunications network often sells network access to rival retailers of telecommunica-
tions services. It is apparent that the established price of the input (the access price)
will a¤ect the outcome of the retail competition between the input supplier and the input
buyers in such settings. A high access price can advantage the input supplier by increasing
the marginal cost of its retail competitors.
It may be less apparent that the procedure employed to set the access price also can have
important implications for industry performance. In particular, endogenous access pricing
(ENAP) can o¤er advantages relative to the more traditional procedure for setting an access
price, a procedure that we call exogenous access pricing (EXAP). Under EXAP, before retail
competition takes place, a regulator sets a specic access price at which retail rivals can
secure access to the network of the incumbent vertically integrated provider (VIP). This
access price reects the regulators estimate of the VIPs average cost of supplying access.1
Under ENAP, the regulator explains before retail competition begins how the access price
will ultimately be determined, but does not specify a specic, immutable access price. Under
ENAP, the unit price that is ultimately charged for access to the incumbents network is
the incumbents realized average cost of supplying access, i.e., the ratio of the VIPs realized
total cost of supplying access to the number of units of access actually supplied.
Fjell et al. (2010) demonstrate that ENAP can help to o¤set an articial competitive
advantage that EXAP provides to a vertically integrated supplier over its non-integrated
retail rivals.2 To explain this advantage most simply, consider a setting in which: (i) the
1Thus, the access price is set to ensure that the VIPs expected revenue from supplying access is equal
to the VIPs cost of supplying access. Klumpp and Su (2010) refer to this common feature of EXAP as
implementing a revenue-neutral access price.
2Fjell et al. (2010) also explain how ENAP can be implemented in practice. The authors note that the
regulator can set an initial access price equal to the expected average cost of supplying access in the coming
year. This initial price is the unit price charged for access throughout the year. Then, once the actual cost
of supplying access and the amount of access supplied during the year are measured, an additional access
1
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only industry production cost is the xed cost of constructing the VIPs network; and (ii)
exactly one unit of the VIPs input is required to produce each unit of retail output. The
VIP faces no marginal cost of retail production under EXAP in this setting. In contrast, the
VIPs non-integrated rivals face a marginal cost equal to the established access price. This
cost asymmetry can enable the VIP to serve a relatively large share of the retail market in
equilibrium.
ENAP reduces the VIPs incentive to expand its retail output. Increased output by the
VIP reduces the access price ultimately charged to retail rivals, and thereby reduces the
VIPs wholesale prot. In fact, the VIP e¤ectively faces the same marginal cost as the
rivals under ENAP. Consequently, its articial cost advantage is eliminated, and so the VIP
expands its output less aggressively under ENAP than under EXAP.
Although they do not analyze ENAP explicitly, Bo¤a and Panzar (2012) demonstrate
the merits of an institutional arrangement that delivers incentives similar to those that
arise under ENAP. The authors consider a setting in which retail suppliers jointly own an
upstream asset (e.g., a telecommunications network). The fraction of the asset that each
retail supplier owns is equal to the suppliers (endogenous) share of equilibrium retail output.
This ownership structure provides strong incentives for all suppliers to expand their retail
output, in part to reduce the upstream unit cost of production (in light of the prevailing
scale economies) and thereby increase upstream prot.
In order to focus on other issues of interest, these pioneering studies of ENAP (and
co-ownership of upstream assets) assume that the upstream supplier operates at minimum
cost. To develop a complete assessment of the merits of ENAP, it is important to analyze
the incentives that ENAP and EXAP provide for cost minimization. The primary purpose
of this research is to demonstrate that ENAP often provides stronger incentives for e¢ cient
surcharge or access rebate is implemented. The surcharge or rebate is calculated to ensure that the nal
unit price paid for access is the realized average cost of supplying access. This procedure is consistent with
the ex post adjustment mechanism that the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC)
included in its access pricing policy for the Australian telecommunications industry in 2003. The mechanism
adjusted access charges for unconditioned local loop service (ULLS) on the basis of the realized demand for
ULLS (ACCC 2003).
2
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upstream operation than does EXAP.
To understand the rationale for this additional potential benet of ENAP, recall that the
VIP enjoys an articial retail cost advantage under EXAP. Higher upstream costs enhance
this advantage because higher upstream costs increase the prevailing access charge. Under
conditions that we identify below, this potential strategic advantage of higher upstream costs
can outweigh the direct burden of higher operating costs, and the VIPs prot can increase
as its upstream production costs rise.
This potential strategic advantage of higher upstream costs does not arise under ENAP.
As noted above, the access price declines as the VIP expands its retail output under ENAP.
Consequently, the VIP e¤ectively perceives a marginal cost of expanded retail output under
ENAP that it does not perceive under EXAP. As we demonstrate below, ENAP induces all
retail rivals to perceive the same marginal cost of retail production regardless of the level of
upstream cost, and so increased upstream costs do not increase the VIPs strategic advantage
over its retail rivals. Consequently, ENAP often provides stronger incentives than EXAP for
upstream cost minimization.
The formal development of this conclusion proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our
model. Section 3 demonstrates that the VIP typically will not intentionally inate its up-
stream operating cost under ENAP. Section 4 identies conditions under which the VIP will
nd upstream cost ination to be protable under EXAP. Section 5 reviews the potential ad-
vantages of ENAP, discusses extensions of our model, and provides concluding observations.
The Appendix presents the proofs of all formal conclusions.
2 The Model
We consider a setting in which a vertically integrated provider (VIP) competes with N
retail rivals to sell a homogenous product to consumers. The VIP is also the sole supplier
of an essential input (e.g., access to the VIPs network). Exactly one unit of the input is
required to produce each unit of the retail product. For simplicity, we abstract from retail
3
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production costs other than the cost of acquiring the essential input from the VIP.3 The unit
cost of acquiring the input is simply the regulated access price, w, that is charged for the
input.
The VIP incurs a xed cost, F , to produce the input. This xed cost might be viewed as
the cost the VIP incurs to build and maintain its network. The minimum xed cost required
for operation is F . If the VIP nds it protable to do so, it can increase F above F , to a
maximum of F . Such cost ination serves only to increase the VIPs upstream operating cost
it does not reduce the VIPs downstream cost or improve network performance.4 Therefore,
cost ination provides no direct value to the VIP. However, as demonstrated below, such
cost ination may benet the VIP by increasing the access price that is charged to retail
rivals.5
F   F can be viewed as the maximum amount of cost ination the VIP can under-
take without detection, and thus without penalty. For analytic simplicity, we assume that
additional cost ination would be detected with su¢ ciently high probability and penalized
su¢ ciently severely that the VIP never increases F above F .6 To ensure that industry op-
eration is potentially protable, F is assumed to be less than the maximum variable prot
that can be secured in the industry.7
The access price that is charged for the essential input varies with the prevailing access
pricing regime. Under exogenous access pricing (EXAP), the access price is w = F
Qe
, where
3The concluding discussion considers positive and asymmetric retail production costs.
4The concluding discussion considers the possibility that cost ination might provide direct benets to the
VIP.
5Klumpp and Su (2010) analyze a setting in which the VIP can increase the quality of the input it supplies by
incurring a higher xed cost of production. The increased quality enhances the demand for the homogeneous
product sold by the retail suppliers. The authors show that the VIP may provide excessive quality under
EXAP in part because retail rivals pay a large share of the costs of enhanced quality.
6Alternatively, the VIP might face expected penalty (F   F ) when it chooses F  F , where () is an
increasing, convex function of F . This formulation would provide similar qualitative conclusions, but with
additional computational complexity.
7To illustrate, when industry demand is linear so that the market-clearing price for industry output Q is
P (Q) = a  bQ (where a > 0 and b > 0 are constants), the prot-maximizing retail output for a monopolist
is a2b , and the corresponding price is
a
2 . Therefore, the maximum variable prot of the monopolist in this
setting is a
2
4b .
4
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Qe denotes the level of total industry output that the regulator expects to be produced.
The regulator announces Qe and F is observed before the industry producers choose their
outputs under EXAP. Consequently, the producers consider the identied access price to be
xed and exogenous when they choose their retail outputs.
Under endogenous access pricing (ENAP), the regulator announces that the access price
will be w(Q) = F
Q
; where Q is the level of industry output that ultimately arises. Therefore,
under ENAP, each producer realizes that an increase in its retail output will cause the access
price that ultimately prevails to decline, ceteris paribus.
We will let q0 denote the VIPs retail output and qi denote the output of retail rival
i 2 f1; :::; Ng. The VIPs prot (0) is the sum of the revenue it secures from providing
access to its retail rivals (w
PN
i=1 qi ) and its retail prot, less its xed cost of production (F ).
The VIPs retail prot is the product of its output (q0) and the prevailing market-clearing
retail price, P (Q), where Q =
PN
j=0 qj .
8 Formally, the VIPs prot is:
0(q0; q1; :::; qN ; w; F ) = P (Q)q0 + w
NX
i=1
qi   F . (1)
The corresponding prot (i) of retail rival i 2 f1; :::; Ng is the product of the rivals
retail output (qi) and its prot margin (P (Q)  w). Formally:
i(q0; q1; :::; qN ; w) = [P (Q)  w ] qi for i 2 f1; :::; Ng . (2)
The timing in the model is as follows. First, the regulator announces the access pric-
ing regime that will be implemented. Second, the VIP chooses F 2 F ; F . Third, the
regulator observes F and reports her observation (truthfully). This report determines the
prevailing access pricing rule (w(Q) = F
Q
) if the regulator has implemented ENAP. If she
has implemented EXAP, the regulator also announces the industry output she expects to be
produced (Qe), which determines the access price that will prevail (w = F
Qe
). Fourth, the
VIP and its N retail rivals choose their outputs simultaneously and independently. Finally,
8Thus, P (Q) represents the inverse demand curve for the retail product.
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the market clearing price is determined, the rms sell their outputs at this price, and the N
retail rivals deliver the required access payments to the VIP.
3 Endogenous Access Pricing
We begin our assessment of the relative impacts of ENAP and EXAP on the incentives for
upstream cost minimization by examining the outcomes that arise under ENAP. Equation
(1) implies that since
PN
i=1 qi = Q   q0 and w = FQ , the VIPs prot-maximizing output
under ENAP is determined by:
@0
@q0
= P (Q) + q0 P
0 (Q)  F
Q2
[Q  q0 ] = 0
) P (Q) + q0 P 0 (Q)  F
Q
+
q0 F
Q2
= 0 . (3)
Similarly, from equation (2), entrant is prot-maximizing output under ENAP is deter-
mined by:
@i
@qi
= P (Q) + qi P
0 (Q)  F
Q
+
qi F
Q2
= 0 for i = 1; :::; N . (4)
It is apparent from equations (3) and (4) that the VIP and each retail rival will produce
the same level of output in equilibrium under ENAP. Formally, employing a ~ above
a variable to denote an outcome under ENAP and using a   to denote an equilibrium
outcome, equations (3) and (4) imply:
eq 0 = eq i = eQ N + 1 for i = 1; :::; N . (5)
Each retail supplier produces the same equilibrium output under ENAP because the VIP
and each retail rival e¤ectively face marginal cost ew = FeQ under ENAP. The VIP faces this
marginal cost because its wholesale prot under ENAP is:
ew NX
i=1
eqi   F = FeQ
h eQ  eq0i  F =   FeQ
 eq0 =   ew eq0 . (6)
Therefore, should the VIP attempt to raise its rivalsunit cost of retail production by arti-
cially inating its xed cost of production, the VIP e¤ectively raises its own operating cost
6
SNF Working Paper No 09/13
symmetrically. Consequently, such cost ination increases the VIPs cost without providing
any strategic advantage. As a result, the VIP generally will refrain from such cost ination
under ENAP, as Proposition 1 reports.
Proposition 1. Suppose P 00(Q)  0 and P 000(Q) is negative or su¢ ciently small in ab-
solute value for all Q  0. Then the VIP always operates with the cost-minimizing technology
under ENAP, i.e., eF  = F:
The structure imposed on the market demand curve in Proposition 1 is su¢ cient, but
not necessary, to ensure that the VIP does not inate its upstream operating cost (F ) under
ENAP. The structure promotes diminishing increases in the VIPs prot as F increases. An
increase in F increases the rivalsmarginal cost of production and thereby induces them
to reduce their output. The output reduction raises the market-clearing retail price, which
enhances the VIPs prot, ceteris paribus. When the inverse demand curve is concave,
successive reductions in rival output produce successively smaller increases in the market
price, generating diminishing increases in the VIPs prot.
4 Exogenous Access Pricing
Although upstream cost ination typically is not protable for the VIP under ENAP,
such ination can provide strategic benets to the VIP that outweigh the corresponding
costs under EXAP. To facilitate the identication of conditions under which the VIP will
nd it protable to intentionally inate its costs under EXAP, it is convenient to consider
the setting in which the industry demand curve is linear.9
Assumption 1. P (Q) = a  bQ, where a > 0 and b > 0 are parameters.
We employ backward induction to determine the equilibrium outcomes under EXAP in
this setting. Lemma 1 identies the output that each industry supplier will produce under
9Klumpp and Su (2010) also analyze a setting in which the demand for the retail product is linear and access
costs are the only costs of retail production.
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EXAP, given an established access price. Lemma 2 characterizes bw(F ), the access price
that will prevail under EXAP when the VIPs xed cost is F .10 Lemma 3 species the
VIPs prot under EXAP as a function of F . Finally, Proposition 2 characterizes the VIPs
prot-maximizing xed cost under EXAP.
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then given access price bw, the equilibrium output
of the VIP under EXAP is bq 0 = a+ bwNb [N+2] . The equilibrium output of each of the N rivals
under EXAP is bq i = a  2 bwb [N+2] for i = 1; :::; N .
Recall that under EXAP, the access price is bw = F
Qe
. Therefore, to characterize bw, it is
necessary to specify the total output the regulator expects to arise in equilibrium (Qe). To
abstract from forecasts of industry activity that are (intentionally or unintentionally) biased,
we assume the regulator estimates the equilibrium output correctly, so Qe = bQ .11 Lemma
2 characterizes the access price that will be implemented under EXAP in this case.12
Lemma 2. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then when the VIPs xed cost is F , the access
price that will be set under EXAP is bw(F ) = 1
2N

a (N + 1) 
qbG(F )  where bG(F ) 
a2 [N + 1]2   4 b F N [N + 2].
Having identied the access price and the outputs that will arise under EXAP for any
given level of xed cost F 2 F ; F , we can now employ equation (1) to specify the VIPs
equilibrium prot under EXAP, given F .
Lemma 3. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then for a given xed cost, F , the VIPs equilib-
rium prot under EXAP is:
10Throughout the ensuing analysis, we will employ a ^ above a variable to denote an outcome under
EXAP.
11The concluding discussion considers alternative possibilities.
12As the proof of Lemma 2 reveals, the access price identied in the lemma is the smallest root of a quadratic
equation. The smallest root is chosen because it is associated with the largest level of industry welfare.
8
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b0(F ) = 1
4 bN2 [N + 2]2
f 2 aN [N + 4]
qbG(F ) + 4 b F N2 [N + 4] [N + 2]
  2 a2N N2 + 3N + 4 g   F .
It can be veried that b 00 (F ) R 0 as F Q 3 a2[N 2]16 bN .13 Therefore, the VIPs prot-
maximizing xed cost under EXAP, bF , is as specied in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then the VIP operates with the cost-minimizing
technology under EXAP if it faces fewer than three retail rivals (i.e., bF  = F if N < 3). In
contrast, if the VIP faces three or more rivals and F is su¢ ciently small (e.g., F < a
2
16 b
),
then the VIP will set bF  = min n3 a2[N 2]
16 bN
; F
o
> F under EXAP.
The conclusions in Proposition 2 reect the following considerations. The VIP experi-
ences a gain and a loss when it increases its xed cost of production above F . The gain
stems from the more pronounced strategic advantage the VIP enjoys in its interaction with
retail competitors. The enhanced strategic advantage arises because the access price under
EXAP ( bw = F
Qe
) increases as F increases, ceteris paribus. Under EXAP, the VIPs rivals
incur marginal cost bw > 0, whereas the VIPs marginal cost of retail output is 0. Therefore,
the VIPs marginal cost advantage increases as F , and thus bw, increases. This increased
cost advantage increases the VIPs share of retail output and thus the VIPs prot, ceteris
paribus.14
The loss the VIP incurs when it increases F above F is the fraction of the increase in
F the VIP is required to bear. Under EXAP, the VIPs expected wholesale prot (i.e., the
di¤erence between its revenue from supplying access and the corresponding cost) is:
bw NX
i=1
bq i   F = FQe [Qe   bq 0 ]  F =  
 bq 0
Qe

F . (7)
13See the proof of Proposition 2.
14Notice from Lemma 1 that the VIPs retail output increases whereas the output of each retail rival declines
as bw increases under EXAP.
9
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Equation (7) implies that the VIP bears the fraction bq 0
Qe
of the xed cost it implements.
These observations imply that when the VIP faces few retail rivals, it bears a relatively
large share of the cost of increasing F while securing an increased retail cost advantage that
is of relatively limited value because the VIP faces few rivals. Consequently, as Proposition 2
reports, the VIP refrains from articial ination of its xed cost of production when it faces
few (i.e., less than three) retail rivals. In contrast, when the VIP faces many retail rivals,
the cost advantage it secures from increasing F is relatively valuable and the fraction of the
increase in F it bears is relatively small. Consequently, the VIP may nd it protable to
increase F above its minimum feasible level, F . Indeed, the VIP will undertake such cost
ination unless F is so large (e.g., F > a
2
16 b
) that even when F = F , the prevailing access
price is su¢ ciently high that the VIP produces a large share of equilibrium retail output. In
this case, an increase in F above F obligates the VIP to bear a large fraction of the increase
in F while enhancing a strategic cost advantage that is of limited value because rivals are
producing relatively little output.
5 Conclusions
We have shown that endogenous access pricing (ENAP) can provide stronger incentives
for upstream cost minimization than exogenous access pricing (EXAP). ENAP enhances the
VIPs incentive to reduce its upstream operating cost because it e¤ectively induces the VIP
to perceive the same marginal cost of production that its retail rivals face. Consequently,
upstream cost increases do not endow the VIP with the same competitive advantage under
ENAP that they provide under EXAP.
In principle, a regulator might attempt to limit a rms incentive to inate its production
cost under EXAP by linking the established access price to an estimate of the rms minimum
feasible operating cost (F ) rather than to the rms observed cost (F ). However, it can be
di¢ cult to derive an accurate estimate of F in practice.15 Our ndings suggest that ENAP
15Kahn et al. (1999) recount the di¢ culties that regulators encountered in attempting to estimate the
minimum possible cost of providing telecommunications services in the United States. Also see Weisman
(2002).
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may be an attractive alternative to EXAP quite generally, but particularly when it is di¢ cult
to derive precise estimates of the VIPs minimum possible operating cost.
Our formal analysis has considered a simple setting for expositional and analytic con-
venience. More general results can be derived. For instance, Proposition 1 (which states
that the VIP will not intentionally inate its production costs under ENAP) continues to
hold in many settings where the VIP and its rivals operate with positive marginal produc-
tion costs.16 Furthermore, although the exact conditions under which the VIP will inate
its xed cost of production under EXAP are more complex when industry suppliers incur
positive marginal production costs, these conditions reect the basic message of Proposition
2. In particular, the VIP often will set F above F when it faces many retail rivals, but will
tend to set F = F when it faces few rivals.17
A VIP may inate its upstream production cost even under ENAP if such cost ination
o¤ers direct benets to the VIP. For example, inated upstream operating costs might take
the form of higher wages, benets, and perquisites for company o¢ cials.18 Even in this case,
though, the incentives for cost ination remain more pronounced under EXAP than under
ENAP, for the reasons identied above.
The VIP typically refrains from cost ination in our model under ENAP even though
the VIP can increase F above F with impunity. This nding implies that the VIP typically
will not raise F above F under ENAP if doing so risks a nancial penalty. In contrast, the
VIP often will continue to increase F above F under EXAP when doing so risks nancial
16This is the case, for example, if market demand is linear and the VIPs marginal cost of retail production
(c0) is no less than the marginal cost of the retail rivals (c). If c0 < c, the possibility arises that an
increase in the equilibrium access charge caused by an increase in F under ENAP might benet the VIP
by particularly disadvantaging its less e¢ cient retail rivals. Of course, the relatively strong incentive for
upstream cost ination persists under EXAP even when c0 < c.
17The same forces that arise in our model with retail quantity competition seem likely to persist in the
presence of retail price competition. Product di¤erentiation may diminish these forces to some extent
under both price and quantity competition, though. The e¤ective cost advantage that vertical integration
confers upon the VIP under EXAP can be less protable for the VIP when product di¤erentiation reduces
the intensity of competition between the VIP and its retail rivals. Consequently, the VIP may be less
inclined to incur higher upstream costs under EXAP in the presence of retail product di¤erentiation.
18Sappington and Sibley (1993) and Blackmon (1994) analyze such regulatory abuse.
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penalty, provided the expected penalty is not too pronounced.19
In closing, we note one additional advantage that ENAP o¤ers relative to EXAP. The
access price that is established under EXAP varies with the level of industry output the
regulator expects to arise in equilibrium. If the regulator over-estimates (under-estimates)
actual industry output, the access price established under EXAP will generate access revenue
below (in excess of) the VIPs xed cost of production (i.e.,
h
F
Qe
i bQ  Q F as Qe R bQ ).
This fact has two primary implications. First, the VIP may not secure the intended level
of wholesale prot under EXAP, whereas ENAP ensures that wholesale revenue matches
wholesale cost. Second, EXAP can invite strategic lobbying to inuence the regulators
estimate of equilibrium industry output. Such lobbying serves no purpose under ENAP
because the access price that is ultimately established varies only with the realized level of
industry output, not with the regulators estimate of this output.
19Because ENAP can reduce the VIPs incentive to inate its upstream production cost, ENAP may mitigate
the incentive of the VIP to over-invest in quality (via increasing the xed cost of upstream production)
that Klumpp and Su (2010) demonstrate can arise under EXAP.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
From (1) and (5), the VIPs equilibrium prot under ENAP is:
0 = q

0 P (Q
) +
F
Q
NX
i=1
qi   F =

Q
N + 1

P (Q) +
F
Q

N Q
N + 1

  F
=

Q
N + 1

P (Q) +
N F
N + 1
  F = 1
N + 1
[Q P (Q)  F ] . (8)
From (3) and (5), equilibrium industry output under ENAP is given by:
P (Q) +

Q
N + 1

P 0 (Q)  F
Q
+
F

Q
N+1

(Q)2
= 0
) P (Q) +

Q
N + 1

P 0 (Q) 

N
N + 1

F
Q
= 0 (9)
) Q [N + 1 ]P (Q) + (Q)2 P 0 (Q) N F = 0 (10)
) Q P (Q) = N F   (Q
)2 P 0 (Q)
N + 1
. (11)
(8) and (11) provide:
0 =
1
N + 1
"
N F   (Q)2 P 0 (Q)
N + 1
  F
#
=   1
[N + 1 ]2

(Q)2 P 0 (Q) + F

) d

0
dF
=   1
[N + 1 ]2

(Q)2 P 00 (Q) + 2QP 0 (Q)
 @Q
@F
+ 1

. (12)
(12) implies that if P 00(Q)  0 and @Q
@F
 0, then d0
dF
< 0, and so the VIP will set
F = F under ENAP. To determine when @Q

@F
 0, let:
h (Q)  Q [N + 1 ]P (Q) + (Q)2 P 0 (Q)
) h0 (Q) = [N + 1 ]P (Q) +Q [N + 1 ]P 0 (Q) + (Q)2 P 00 (Q) + 2Q P 0 (Q)
= [N + 1 ]P (Q) +Q [N + 3 ]P 0 (Q) + (Q)2 P 00 (Q)
) h00 (Q) = [N + 1 ]P 0 (Q) + [N + 3 ]P 0 (Q) +Q [N + 3 ]P 00 (Q)
+ (Q)2 P 000(Q) + 2Q P 00 (Q)
= [ 2N + 4 ]P 0 (Q) +Q [N + 5 ]P 00 (Q) + (Q)2 P 000 (Q) . (13)
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(13) implies that h00 () < 0, and so h () is a concave function of Q, under the maintained
conditions. From (10), Q is determined by h(Q) = N F , and so (10) will have at least
one real root when F is su¢ ciently small. Furthermore, when (10) has two real roots, the
larger root of (10) decreases as F increases, and so @Q

@F
< 0, when h () is a concave function
of Q.
It remains to verify that the larger root of (10) is the relevant root in cases where (10) has
two roots. To do so, let Q1 and Q

2 denote two distinct roots of (10), with Q

1 < Q

2. We will
show that @
20
@(q0)
2

Q1
> 0, and so the smaller root does not correspond to a prot-maximizing
level of output for the VIP.
From (9):
g (Q)  g1 (Q)  g2 (Q) = 0 , (14)
where:
g1 (Q
) = P (Q) +

Q
N + 1

P 0 (Q) and g2 (Q) =

N
N + 1

F
Q
. (15)
Observe that:
g02 (Q
) =  

N
N + 1

F
(Q)2
< 0 ) g002 (Q) =

N
N + 1

2F
(Q)3
> 0 . (16)
Therefore, g2 (Q) is a decreasing, convex function of Q.
Also observe that:
g01 (Q
) =

1 +
1
N + 1

P 0 (Q) +

Q
N + 1

P 00 (Q) < 0 (17)
) g001 (Q) =

1 +
1
N + 1

P 00 (Q) +

1
N + 1

P 00 (Q) +

Q
N + 1

P 000 (Q)  0 .
Therefore, g1 (Q) is a decreasing, concave function of Q under the maintained conditions,
and so, from (14), g (Q) is a concave function of Q.
We now establish that g0 (Q1) > 0 . To do so, consider the interval [Q

1; Q

1 +  ] ; where
 > 0 is arbitrarily small. (14) implies that g (Q1) = 0. Furthermore, g (Q
) > 0 for all
Q 2 (Q1; Q1 + ) since g (Q) is a concave function of Q. Therefore, g0 (Q1) > 0.
From (1) and (5):
@0
@q0
= P (Q) + q0 P 0 (Q)  F
(Q)2
NX
i=1
qi
) @
20
@ (q0)
2 = 2P
0 (Q) + q0 P 00 (Q) +
2F
(Q)3
NX
i=1
qi
) @
20
@ (q0)
2

q0 = q

i =
Q1
N+1
= 2P 0 (Q1) +

Q1
N + 1

P 00 (Q1) +
2F
(Q1)
3

N Q1
N + 1

14
SNF Working Paper No 09/13
= 2P 0 (Q1) +

Q1
N + 1

P 00 (Q1) +
2F
(Q1)
2

N
N + 1

. (18)
From (14), (16), and (17):
g0 (Q1) =

1 +
1
N + 1

P 0 (Q1) +

Q1
N + 1

P 00 (Q1) +

N
N + 1

F
(Q1)
2
=

N + 2
N + 1

P 0 (Q1) +

Q1
N + 1

P 00 (Q1) +

N
N + 1

F
(Q1)
2
=
N
N + 1

P 0 (Q1) +
F
(Q1)
2

+

2
N + 1

P 0 (Q1) +

Q1
N + 1

P 00 (Q1) . (19)
Since g0 (Q1) > 0, (19) implies:
P 0 (Q1) +
F
(Q1)
2 > 0 . (20)
From (18):
@20
@ (q0)
2

q0 = q

i =
Q1
N+1
=

2N
N + 1

P 0 (Q1) +

2
N + 1

P 0 (Q1)
+

Q1
N + 1

P 00 (Q1) +
2F
(Q1)
2

N
N + 1

=
2N
N + 1

P 0 (Q1) +
F
(Q1)
2

+

2
N + 1

P 0 (Q1) +

Q1
N + 1

P 00 (Q1) . (21)
(19) and (21) provide:
@20
@ (q0)
2

q0 = q

i =
Q1
N+1
=
N
N + 1

P 0 (Q1) +
F
(Q1)
2

+ g0 (Q1) . (22)
(20) and (22) imply that @
20
@(q0)
2

q0 = q

i =
Q1
N+1
> 0, since g0 (Q1) > 0. 
Proof of Lemma 1.
Di¤erentiating (1) and (2) provides:
@0
@q0
= a  2 b q0   b
NX
j=1
qj and
@i
@qi
= a  b qi   b q0   b
NX
j=1
qj   w . (23)
In equilibrium, @0
@q0
= @i
@qi
= 0. Therefore, from (23):
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a  2 b q0 = b
NX
j=1
qj = a  b qi   b q0   w
, b qi = b q0   w ) b
NX
i=1
qi = N b q0   wN . (24)
Since @0
@q0
= 0 in equilibrium, (23) and (24) provide:
a  2 b q0  N b q0 + wN = 0 ) bq 0 = a+ wNb [N + 2] . (25)
(24) and (25) provide:
bN bq i = N b  a+ wNb (N + 2)

  wN = aN + wN
2   wN [N + 2]
N + 2
=
aN   2wN
N + 2
) bq i = a  2wb [N + 2] .  (26)
Proof of Lemma 2.
(25) and (26) imply:
bQ  = q0 + NX
i=1
bq i = a+ wNb [N + 2] + N [a  2w ]b [N + 2] = a [N + 1]  wNb [N + 2] . (27)
Therefore, when Qe = bQ :
w =
FbQ  = b F [N + 2]a [N + 1]  wN ) N w2   a [N + 1]w + F [N + 2] b = 0
) bw(F ) = a [N + 1] 
q
a2 [N + 1]2   4 b F N [N + 2]
2N
. (28)
The smallest root here reects the fact that the lower access price generates larger industry
output and welfare. A real solution to (28) exists because:
a2 [N + 1]2   4N F [N + 2] b  0 , F  a
2 [N + 1]2
4 bN [N + 2]
. (29)
Observe that [ a(N+1) ]
2
4 bN [N+2]
> a
2
4 b
, since [N + 1]2 > N [N + 2]. 
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Proof of Lemma 3.
For expositional ease, we suppress the dependence of bw() and bG() on F in the ensuing
analysis. From (1), (25), (26), and (27):
b 0 = bq 0 ha  b bQ i+ bw NX
i=1
bq i   F
=
a+ bwN
[N + 2] b

a+ bwN
N + 2

+ bw N (a  2 bw)
b (N + 2)

  F = H
b [N + 2]2
  F (30)
where H = [a+ bwN ]2 + [N + 2] bwN [a  2 bw ]
= a2 +N2 bw2 + 2 aN bw + aN2 bw + 2 a bwN   2N2 bw2   4 bw2N
= a2 + aN bw [N + 4]  bw2N [N + 4]
= a2+aN [ 4 +N ]
"
a (N + 1) 
pbG
2N
#
 N [N + 4]
"
a2 [N + 1]2 + bG  2 a [N + 1]pbG
4N2
#
=
1
4N2
f 4N2 a2 + 2 aN2 [N + 4]
h
a (N + 1) 
pbG i
  N [N + 4]
h
a2 (N + 1)2 + bG  2a (N + 1)pbG ig
=
1
4N2
f 4N2 a2 + 2 a2N2 [N + 4] [N + 1] 
h
2 aN2 (N + 4)
pbG i
  a2N [N + 4] [N + 1]2 + 2 aN [N + 4] [N + 1]
pbG
  N [N + 4] a2 (N + 1)2   4 bN F (N + 2) g
=
1
4N2
f 4N2a2 + 2 a2N2 [N + 4] [N + 1]  2 a2N [N + 4] [N + 1]2
  2 aN2 [N + 4]
pbG +2 aN [N + 4] [N + 1]pbG +4 b F N2 [N + 4] [N + 2] g
=
1
4N2
f 2 a2N N2 + 3N + 4+ 2 aN [ 4 +N ]pbG + 4 b F N2 [N + 4] [N + 2] g. (31)
(30) and (31) provide the expression for b 0 (F ) specied in the lemma. 
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Proof of Proposition 2.
Di¤erentiating b 0 (F ) provides:
b 00 (F ) = 1
4 bN2 [N + 2]2
"
aN [4 +N ]
bG0(F )pbG + 4 bN2 (N + 4) (N + 2)
#
  1
=

1
4 bN2 [N + 2]2
"
  4 aN
2 [N + 4] [N + 2] bpbG + 4 bN2 [N + 4] [N + 2]
#
  1
=
4N2 [N + 4] [N + 2] b
4 bN2 [N + 2]2
"
  apbG + 1
#
  1 = N + 4
N + 2
"
  apbG + 1
#
  1 . (32)
(32) implies:
b 00 (F ) R 0 , N + 4N + 2
"
  apbG + 1
#
R 1
,   apbG + 1 R N + 2N + 4 ,   apbG R N + 2N + 4   1 ,   apbG R  2N + 4
, apbG Q 2N + 4 ,
pbG
a
R N + 4
2
,
pbG R [N + 4] a
2
, bG R [N + 4]2 a2
4
, [a (N + 1) ]2   4N F [N + 2] b R [N + 4]
2 a2
4
, a2
"
(N + 1)2   (N + 4)
2
4
#
R 4 bN F [N + 2]
, a2 4 (N + 1)2   (N + 4)2 R 16 bN F [N + 2]
, a2 [ 3 (N + 2) (N   2)] R 16 bN F [N + 2] , F Q 3 a
2 [N   2 ]
16 bN
. (33)
(33) implies that @

0
@F
< 0 (and so bF  = F ) if N  2. In contrast, if N  3, then bF  =
min
n
max

F ; 3 a
2[N 2]
16 bN

; F
o
. Consequently, bF  > F if F < 3 a2[N 2]
16 bN
. This will be the
case if F < a
2
16 b
, since r(N)  N 2
N
is an increasing function of N with r(3) = 1
3
. 
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Endogenous access pricing (ENAP) is an alternative to the more traditional form of 
access pricing that sets the access price to reflect the regulator’s estimate of the 
supplier’s average cost of providing access. Under ENAP, the access price reflects the 
supplier’s actual average cost of providing access, which varies with realized industry 
output. We show that in addition to eliminating the need to estimate industry output 
accurately and avoiding a divergence between upstream revenues and costs, ENAP 
can enhance the incentive of a vertically integrated producer to minimize its upstream 
operating cost.
